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ABSTRACT
ONTHE RELEVANCE OR IRRELEVANCE OF PUBLIC FINANCIAL POLICY:
INDEXATION, PRICE RIGIDITIES AND OPTIMAL ?IONETARY POLICIES
This paper is concernedwith delineating conditions under which public
financialpolicies have no real and/orprice effects. In theabsence of
intergenerationaldistribution effects, public financial policy is irrelevant:
an increase in government debt (whether indexed or not), an exchange of an
indexed bond for a non—indexed bond, or an exchange of a short term bond for
a long term bond has neither real nor financial effects. We also describe
changes in financial policy in which the supply of bonds are increased and
the nominal interest rate increases, which have an effect on the rate of
inflation, but no real effects. We examine the implications of price and
wage rigidities and the existence of a non—interest bearing financial asset
used for transactions purposes for the validity of these irrelevance theorems.
In general, public financial policies have effects on intergenerational
distribution; alternative financial policies have implications for the pattern
of capital accumulation (an effect which was the center of the literature on
money and growth) and on the sharing of risks among members of different
generations. We examine the consequences of three alternative financial
policies,a fixed supply of financial assets, a fixed price level, and a fixed
real supply of government indebtedness; under some plausible conditions, the
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Does it make any difference whether or not the government issues indexed
bonds? Few governments have, in fact, issued such bonds, in spite of repeated
calls from distinguished economists for them to do so. Is the failure to
issue these bonds an example of lack of innovativeness of government officials?
What difference would such bonds make to the equilibrium of the economy?
This question is part of a much broader question, of the effect of
alternative public financial policies. The effect of any single policy,
such as the issuance of indexed bonds, cannot be analyzed in isolation from
the other aspects of public financial policy. Moreover, the effect of any
change in government policy today cannot be assessed without specifying, at
the same time, future governmental policies (or perhaps more accurately,
specifying the beliefs of economic agents concerning those future govern—
ment policies). Finally, it is our contention that a central aspect of
public financial policy is the intertemporal (intergenerational) distribu—
tion of income andriskbearing which it generates.
In the absence of these intergenerational distribution effects, public
financial policy is irrelevant. In Section I, we show that an increase in
government debt (whether indexed or not), an exchange of an indexed bond for
a non—indexed bond, or an exchange of a short-term bond for a long—term bond
(which corresponds in our model to an open market operation), has neither
real nor financial effects. The first result——on the irrelevance of govern-
ment deficits——we have referred to (Stiglitz (1982)) as Say's law of
government deficits: an increase in the supply of government bonds gives
rise to an equal increase in the demand for government bonds.2
These results are in marked contrast to those suggested, for instance,
by the standard portfolio theories. In those models, an increase in the
supply of one kind of financial asset and a decrease in the supply of another
will have real effects: the risk properties of these different financial
assets are different, and because of risk aversion, individuals will want to
diversify their portfolios among the different assets. A change in the supply
of different assets necessitates a change in the equilibrium prices, and
these changes in equilibrium prices have real consequences (say, for the
pattern and level of investment). Our analysis differs from these models in
that they fail to take into account the implicit liability associated with
government bonds, and the change in that liability with a change in the level
or form of government bonds. When there are no intergenerational distribution
effects of public financial policy, and when individuals do take their future
tax liabilities into account, then it turns out that public financial poliçy
including the issuance of indexed bonds, is irrelevant.1
The more relevant case, however, is that where public financial policy
has an effect on the intergenerational distribution of income. The litera-
ture on money and growth in the late 1960s emphasized this role of debt
policy.2 As such, the effects of debt policy cannot be analyzed separately
1. Our result can thus be viewed as extending the well knownBarro—Ricardo
results to an explicitly stochastic environment, in tne absence of tin—
certainty, all assets are perfect substitutes, and thus the question of
the effect of public financial policy on the relative prices of different
assets does not arise.
2. The original papers by Tobin (1965) and Johnson (1966) gave rise to a
large literature; see, for instance, Shell, Sidrauski, and Stiglitz (1967).
Although much of this literature employed ad hoc savings assumptions, the
work of Sidrauski (1967) and the life cycle models of Diamond (1965) and
Cass—Yaari (1967) showed how the results could be extended to models with
explicit intertemporal utility maximizing individuals.3
from those of social security and tax policy, as noted by Atkinson-Stiglitz
(1980). These studies, however, analyzed public financial policy ina
completely non—stochastic framework. When there is uncertainty, when there
is a variability in the productivity of labor and capital, then public finan—
cial policy has an additional role: it is concerned not only with control—
ling the optimal rate of capital accumulation, but also with the sharing of
risks among members of different generations. This notionappears in earlier
discussions of the burden of the debt. Could the generation alive at the
time of World War II manage to shift the burden of paying for thatwar to
future generations, by financing the war by means of debt? Fora period,
the consensus, at least of textbook writers, was no: the resourcesforegone
during the war were spent at that time. As long as we "owe the debt to
ourselves" (i.e., we do not finance the war through borrowing abroad), how
we finance it cannot make a difference. The view taken here is that the
burden of the war can indeed be shared with succeeding generations,' and
this sharing is implemented through public financial policies, including
socIal security and debt policy. Though we will not address the question of
how the costs of a particular event, such as a majorwar, should be shared
among different generations, we will address the question of how public
financial policy can be used to smooth out the variability in intergenera-.
tional welfare induced by variability in the productivity of labor and capital.
In the context of a life cycle model, where public financial policy
affects the intertemporal distribution of welfare, public financial policy
1. For instance, by increasing current consumption at the cost of investment
in the war period, and transferring wealth from young to old in the peace—
time periods thatfollow.4
does, in general, matter. Some kinds of public financial policies have finan-
cial effects (i.e., affect price levels) but have no real effects. We discuss
two important instances. First, an increase in the rate of interest paid on
government bonds, with the ensuing deficits financed by the issuance of addi-
tional bonds, has no real effects. Secondly, if all members alive in one
generation were identical, any intertemporal distribution of welfare that was
desired could be attained through the use of a single financial asset; thus,
adding additional financial assets——such as indexed bonds—-makes no difference.
Again, indexed bonds serve no function.
More generally, changes in public financial policies have real effects.
For instance, when there is more than one type of individual alive in a given
generation, then issuing indexed bonds can have a real effect, even if there
is a complete set of intragenerational risk markets.
Once it is recognized that public financial policy matters, it becomes
important to ascertain the effects of alternative policies. Although the
characterization of the first—best policies, for any stochastic structure of
general interest, Is beyond the scope of this paper, we present some preliminary
results comparing the welfare effects of three simple rules. The first attempts
to keep prices constant, the second attempts to keep the value of real debt
constant, and the third keeps the level of debt constant (this corresponds,
in our model, to the Friedman rule of a constant growth in the money supply,
since, in our model, we have no exogenous sources of growth).
Our analysis suggests that a policy of holding the value of the out-
standing debt constant may be preferable to the other two. An outsider, not
knowing that the government was following a policy aimed at maintaining a
constant value of the outstanding debt, might be misled by the empirical5
observation that in such an economy the price level moves in proportion to
debt, into believing that the level of debt determines the price level; in
fact, both are responding to the exogenous shocks which the economy is
experiencing.
For reasons that we detail below, for most of the analysis we assume
a single short—term government financial asset, which normally is interest
bearing. We focus on the role of government debt as a store of value,
ignoring its potential role as a medium of exchange. In Section IV we show
how the analysis can easily be modified to incorporate explicitly non—
interest bearing government debt (money); if anything, the transactions
demand for money strengthens our earlier results on the relevance of public
financial policy.
Up to this point, the models we use are all neoclassical, assuming
full employment of labor and capital. Yet one of the more important func-
tions of public financial policy, as it is usually conceived, is to affect
the level of national income and employment. Recent theoretical work using
models of rational expectations has questioned the ability of the government
to use financial policy to affect the level of national income (other than
by adding noise, making it more difficult for economic agents to distinguish
real shocks from monetary shocks, and as a result, making it more difficult
for economic agents to respond efficiently to changed circumstances).' In
1. Obviously, if the government has an informational advantage over the
private sector, it could base its public financial policy on that inf or—
mation; public financial policy would thus convey information from the
government to the private sector. But this is a peculiarly inefficient
way of conveying information, and there is little evidence that the
monetary authorities are privy to information that is not publicly
available.6
our neoclassical models, we assume rational expectations and symmetric in---
formation; yet alternative financial policies do have an effect, both on the
level of capital accumulation and on the labor supply (through the income
effects associated with the intertemporal distribution of income).1
In Section V, we show that public financial policy may be even more
effective if wages and prices are not perfectly flexible, so that there is
not full employment. Again, we postulate rational expectations. This result
reemphasizes the result noted by others (see, e.g., Taylor (1980), Neary—
Stiglitz (1982)) that the conclusion of the rational expectations models
concerning the inefficacy of government policy does not depend so much on
the expectational assumptions as on other features of the model; in particular,
the assumptions concerning wage and price flexibility.
Before beginning the formal analysis, two remarks may be helpful.
First, we limit ourselves throughout to public financial policies; real
government expenditures are assumed to remain constant (at each date and
in each state). Second, the question is sometimes posed, what can the gov—
ernment do that the private sector cannot do—-or at least undo? There is
a simple answer here: the government can enforce intergenerational redis—
tributions. And there is, in the life cycle model, an implicit market
failure. Individuals in one generation cannot trade with those of another
generation; in particular, they cannot engage in the sharing of risks.. (Of
necessity, then, the set of Arrow—Debreu contingent claims markets must be
1. We assume throughout that the only taxes imposed are lump sum taxes;
if, more realistically, we had assumed a distortionary Income or wage
tax, then there would be further supply effects.7
incomplete).The government provides a mechanism by which thiskind of
risk sharing can occur.'
For most of the analysis, we focus our attentionon a model in which
all individuals within a generationare identical; for those who are alive
and can trade with each other, weassume that there are perfect markets.
II. Three General Irrelevance Theorems
In this section, we prove threevery general theorems, establishing
the irrelevance of a wide class ofgovernment financial policies. We
establish the results in the context ofa simple model of an economy with
overlapping generations and a constant population.Following the proof of
the first irrelevance theorem, wecomment on the implications of this result
for an economy with a single, infinitely livedgeneration.
2.1 The Model
Each generation lives for three periods; individualswork in the first
two, and live off their savings in the third. (Later,we shall consider a
simplification where individuals live for only twoperiods.) We thus write
the utility function of an individual bornat time t
1.Similarremarks canbe made about the role of thegovernment inredis- tribution ingeneral. If, behind the veil of ignorance, before indi-
viduals knew the endowments with whichthey were to be born they could
sell enforceable Insurance policies to eachother, with the payoffs a
function of what endowments they werepresented with, or of observable
variables which were a function of thoseendowments, then it might be
argued that there would be no need for the government to takea role in
redistribution. But such insurance markets do notexist, and hence the
role of the government in redistribution. (Thisway of looking at
matters has, of course, its problems: should weassume that, in the
original state, the individual knows what preferences he is to been-
dowed with? How can we reasonably describe his behaviorprior to being endowed with preferences?)8
(1) Ut =U(ci,c2, c3, Lit, L2)
where
c1 =thetth generation's consumption in the th period
of their life;
Lit the tth generation's labor supply in the th period
of their life.
For simplicity, we assume that the wage that an old individual receives is
the same as the wage that a young person receives; both are random variables
which are exogenously determined.'
We assume that the government can impose age—specific lump sum taxes,2
but that all individuals within a generation must be treated the same. For
the moment, we assume that all individuals within a generation are identical;
and hence this constraint is of no consequence; later, when we assume that
there are different individuals within a generation, this constraint will
have some real consequences. We denote the lump sum tax imposed on the
• th generation in the iperiod of its life by Tit .(Tjmay be negative,
i.e., the government may provide a lump sum subsidy; thus a social security
paymentcorresponds to T3 <0.)
1.It would be easy to extend the model to allow the wage to depend, for
instance, on the capital stock.
2. The assumption that taxes are non—distortionary is important; it implies,
in particular, that what individuals are concerned about is only the
present discounted value of their tax liabilities, not the timing of
those liabilities. With distortionary taxes, say, on wage income, the
time of the imposition of the tax is critical.9
Individuals take their after—tax income and either consume itor invest
it. There are three classes of securities in which theycan invest:
(1) Capital (equity), the return to which is a random variable, i9
(ii)Government securities. We shall distinguish severalgovernment
securities:
a. A short-term bond: In this model, we shall assume that there
is a single non—indexed short—term government bond, and that it is (orat
least may be) interest bearing: itmay be thought of as interest bearing
money. The price of this bond in terms of consumption goods is denoted by
v ,andp =1/vis the price level. The real return on holding a short—
term bond purchased at time twitha nominal rate of i is'
_________ - (2) =
Pt
Even though the nominal interest is known, the real return on short—term
bonds is risky, because the price level next period is unknown.
b. Short—term indexed bonds: These specIfy a real rate of




1. At the time the individual buys a short—term bond, he knowsi ,buthe
does not know vt+1 .Wefollow the convention of denoting a random var-
iable with a tilde, but will drop the tilde when the context makes clear
the fact that the variable in question is stochastic.
2. If we denote the state of nature at time tbyO ,thenwhile the
interest on short—term (unindexed) bonds is a function of O,andthe
real return a function of 0t and 0t,forindexed bonds, the real
return Is only a function of O10
where is the price, in terms of consumption goods, of a short—term
indexed bond at date t
c.Long—term bonds: For simplicity, we shall only consider here
perpetuities, with a fixed interest payment i per bond. (Other long—term
bonds may be easily introduced into the model.) The real return on long—
term bonds is a random variable, because the price at which the bond can be
sold is uncertain. We denote the real rate of return by 2t
+ Vt÷ll
—1=
Theaggregate supply of the short—term bonds is denoted by B .The
aggregate supply of short—term indexed bonds is denoted by D1 ,oflong—
term bonds by D2and the price of short—term indexed bonds in terms of
consumption goods is denoted by q1 ,andthat of long—term bonds q2
The holdings of the young of the th security are denoted byDii ,and
those of the old by D2.
(iii) Exchange securities. These are trades between individuals both
living over two periods (thus in our model, in which all individuals within
a generation are identical, they are trades between the young and the middle
aged);2 the th exchange security promises topay e.(O) the second
period if state 0 occurs, and costs Z. the first period. Because the
payment is state dependent, and because prices are state dependent, it makes
1. The notation is chosen to make it clear how the analysis can be extended
to additional government securities.
2. In a life cycle model with individuals living only two periods and all
individuals within a generation being identical, there is no scope for
exchange securities.ii
no difference at this level of generality whether we denominate the payments
in consumption goods or in dollars (short—term bonds). It ismore convenient
to denominate them in terms of consumption goods. An exchange security which
payse(O) in terms of consumption goods pays e(O)p(O) in terms of
dollars. (An Arrow—Debreu security is one whichpays in only one state of
nature; in all other states e(O) =0.)An indexed loan (ignoring the possi-
bility of default) has the property that e(O) =constantfor all 0 .An
unindexed loan has the property that e(O) varies inversely with p(0)
Nl.t is the quantity of the th security purchased by the young at time
t ; N2, is the quantity purchased by the middle aged.
The individual's budget constraints. The individual maximizes his ex-
pected utility subject to his budget constraints:
a.His wage income the first year of his life is either consumed,
invested, or paid to the government in lump sum taxes.
(3a) wLi =ci+ Alt + Tit
where w is the real wage rate at t and whereAi is his asset holdings
the first period of his life, which consist of capital, governmentsecurities,
or exchange securities.
(3b) Alt =Ki+ vtBi + +Z.tNi.
where Bit is the holdings of short—term bonds by the young, andKit is
their holdings of capital.12
b.At the beginning of the second period, his portfolio is worth
2
(3c) W2 E(l+n)Ki+ v(l+pt)Bi + (l+r.)q.D1. +
3— 3
This, plus his wage income, is either consumed, invested, or paid out in
taxes:
(3d) W2 + w+iL2t =c2+ A2t +T2t
where again, his asset holdings consist of capital (K2+i), government
securities (B2+i) ,orexchange securities:
(3e) = +v+iB2t+1 + Eq.÷1D2.1 +
c. In the third period of his life, he consumes his savings less any






We canthusderive the individual's consumption functions anddemandfor
asset equations. These are of the form
y1 =yi(w,Tin; X, X+1; t+l T2, T3)
=y2(w+i,T2; W2; X+1; T3)
where13
y1 {ci, Lit, Kit, vtBt,
L, K2t+l, v+iB2+i,
and
X E{Fj, nt,r2t, fe}}
and where is defined by (3d), and c3 is given by (3f). Consumption,
labor and portfolio decisions depend on wealth and the joint probability
distribution of future wages, returns on assets, and taxes.'
The government's budget constraint and the national income identities.
Each period, the government makes decisions concerning its expenditure (G),
thesupply of bonds of various sorts, the interest rate which it will pay,
and the taxes it will impose. It must do this within its budget constraint,
which says that its expenditures (including Interest payments) must be equal
to its receipts (taxes plus issue of new debt).
It is easiest if we first express the budget constraint in terms of
dollars, and then rewrite it using our consumption numeraire. Since govern-
ment expenditures, G ,andtaxes
T =T,+ T2t1 + T32
are both expressed in real terms, the dollar deficit of the government is
—Tt+i]+ + iDi + iD2
1. If utility functions are not intertemporaily separable, then past con-
sumption and labor decisions also are relevant.14
which must be financed by new debt,
Bt÷lBt + D.)







—(l+p)vB+ E (q.÷1D.1 —(l+r.)q.D.)
where we have made use of (2).
MarketEquilibrium
Market equilibrium requires that the demand for each kind of government
security add up to its supply, and that the net demand for exchange sacurites
be zero:'
(Sa) Bi + B2 =Bt
(5b)Di.t + D2 =D. j= 1,2
(5c) + N2.t =0
1. In addition, we require, of course, that the demand fo.r labor equals the
supply.15
Wairas' law assures us that if each individual's budget constraint is
satisfied, and the government's budget constraint is also satisfied, then
the national income constraint is satisfied:
(6) c1 + c21 + c32 +Kt_K1 w(L1+ T2t—l +fliK \ ________1 '
consumption investment wage income return to capital
where Kt is the aggregate capital stock,
(7) Kit +K2t =
Informulating their consumption—investment strategy, individuals must
form expectations concerning the joint probability distribution of future
wage rates, taxes, and returns on different securities. A rational expec-
tations equilibrium is one in which those subjective probability distributions
(conditional on whatever is observable at the time the expectations are
formed) correspond to the conditional probability distributions actually
generated in the equilibrium.
2.2 Neutrality Propositions
There are two classes of neutrality propositions: those which establish
that a particular perturbation in the financial policy of the government has
no real affects and no effects on the level of prices, and those which es-
tablish that a particular perturbation in the financial policy of thegov-
ernment has no real effects, but has effects on the level of prices. (The
classical proposition concerning the neutrality of money was of the second
kind; it asserted that doubling the money supplied doubled the price level,
but had no further real effects on the economy.)16
2.3 The First Irrelevance Theorem (Say's Law of Government Deficits)
An increase in short—term government debt, with the proceeds used to
finance a reduction in lump sum taxes on the young or middle aged, followed
by a decrease in the government debt, financed by an increase in taxes of
the middle aged and the aged (in proportion to the reduction in taxes which
they experienced the previous period) has neither real nor financial effects.
An increase in the supply of government bonds gives rise to an exactly equal
and offsetting increase in the demand for government bonds, provided that
thereare no intergenerational distributional consequences of the government
policy.
Assumewe are initially in an equilibrium, denoted by
** *
lt' 2t—l' 3t—2' !' t
where E (vt, {q.},[z.}) is the vector of prices, and
(Br, {D.}
Ttt, {N.}) is the corresponding vector of government debt and
taxes and private securities. Then the first irrelevance theorem is concerned
with the following change in government policy: at t,thegovernment
increases B by an amount LB ,andgenerates thereby a surplus vAB
whichit distributes to the young and the middle aged, so that
(8) + 2-l=
whereiT denotes the change in the lump sum tax liability.
Then, next period it returns the debt to its original level. To do
this, it must raise additional taxes, in the amount of (measured in consump-
tion good numeraire)17
(l+i)vA1AB
It does this by levying lump sum taxes on the middleaged and the aged in
proportion totheir previous tax reduction, so
LT it— 2t—l
2t 3t—l
Thus, if a fraction o of the tax revenues the first period wentto the young
(lOa) =
—avAB'
then later they pay the same fraction of thesubsequent increase in taxes
(lob)2t =—a(l+i")v'1AB"
To establish the result, we first will show that ifprices remain un-
changed, then the feasible consumption sets remain unchanged. If the feasible
consumption sets remain unchanged, then clearly each individual will choose
the same consumption plan as in the initial situation. We willthen estab-
lish that when they do this, the demand for allassets (including the demand
for short—term government bonds) equals the supply of allassets, and all
markets clear.
To see that if prices remain unchanged the set of feasibleconsumption
plans remain unchanged, denote by a single caret a feasibleconsumption
investment strategy in the initial situation, and by a doublecaret one in
the new situation. Let
(ha) =it£it = alli,t18
A
(lib)N. =N.. all i,j,t
iJt
A




Bit = alli,t except I =1,2and t=t
Individualsdo exactly what they would have done in the initial situation,
except that those whose tax liability is reduced spend their extra income to
purchase short—term (unindexed) government bonds.
Direct substitution into the budget constraints (3a) —(3f)makes it
clear that if the first set of consumption—investment plans is feasible in
the initial situation, the second set of consumption—investment plans is
feasible in the new situation.
The reason for this can be easily seen. The bonds which the young have
purchased with the extra revenues they receive the first period increase
their assets the next period by the amount
v÷i(1+i+i)Ti =v÷i(l+i+1)ct
LB
But this is exactly equal to their increased tax liability (given by (lob)).
This establishes that individuals can do as well under the new public
financial policy as under the old. Exactly the same arguments can be used
to establish that any consumption sequence which is feasible under the new19
public financial policy is feasible in the original situation. Thus, the
two consumption opportunity sets are identical.
Since the consumption opportunity sets are identical, it is clear that
if individuals chose the single—careted values of variables in the initial
situation, they will choose the double—careted values in the new situation.
We now need only check that all markets clear.
Since the demand for all securities except short—term bonds has remained
unchanged, if the demand for each kind of security equals the supply in the
initial situation, it does in the new situation.
Similarly for all consumption and capital goods. By Wairas' law, if
all but one market clears, the last market must clear, thusestablishing that
the double—careted values do represent an equilibrium.
It may be useful, however, to examine in somewhat greater detail the
market for short—term bonds.




1.In this analysis we have assumed that there are no borrowing limitations.
More generally, since the real position of the individual is unaffected,
one might argue that if in the new situation the individual is calledupon
to borrow more (to replicate the same pattern of consumption), he should
be able to do so at the same terms as he borrowed previously. But this
argument is not quite correct if there is any possibility of bankruptcy
(in any of the relevant points in the consumption opportunity set). Full
equivalence would require, for instance, that an individual could sell a
claim on a (contingent) future lump sum payment. This is presently not
possible. More generally, the considerations which are relevant here are
analogous to those which arise in the case of the Corporate Irrelevance
Theorems (Stiglitz (1969, 1974)).20
which is just equal to the increase in the supply of bonds (using (8)).
Hence,the demand for short—term bonds is equal to the supply of short—term
bonds: the increase in government debt has given rise to an exactly equal
andoffsetting increase in the demand for bonds.
Several comments are in order. First, if all of the proceeds of the
increased debt went to reduce the tax liabilities of the young, the reduction
in the debt could have occurred either the next or thefollowing period; the
reduction in the debt wouldhave to be financed, of course, by a levy on the
samegeneration (the middle aged, if donethe period immediately following
theincreased deficit; the aged, if done the following period). More gen-
erally, if each generation lives for n periods, the deficit need not be
reduced until n periods later. All that is required for the validity of
theirrelevance theorem isthat there be no intergenerational redistribution;
that is, those who benefit from the increased deficit, through lower taxes,
must be the same ones who pay for the subsequent reduction in the government
debt (and who pay for the interest in the intervening periods). By the same
token, as we shall emphasize in the next section, whenever there are inter-
generational redistributions effected through the deficit policy, then public
financial policy is not irrelevant; it has real effects.
It is important to observe that the individual, when he decides to buy
the additional short—term bonds, does not know the real return on these bonds;
there is uncertainty concerning the price level. He does not spend the in-
crease in his purchasing power, made possible by the reduction in his lump
sum taxes, in a "balanced" way, keeping, say, the relative proportions of
safe and risky assets (capital, indexed bonds, long—term bonds, short—term
unindexed bonds) unchanged. The individual knows that there is risk asso—21
ciated with his tax liabilities in the future, and he chooses his portfolio
to take this risk into account. When he does this, it turns out that he
increases his demand for the securities which have increased in supply by
exactly the amount that they have increased in supply. -
Argumentsanalogous to those presented for changes in the short-term
bond supply can be made for changes in the supply of other bonds. Rather
than repeat the argument, we consider, in the next section, the consequences
of a change in the structure of the public debt.
2.4 The Second Irrelevance Theorem
A temporary change in the structure of the government debt has no real
or financial effects, provided it is accompanied with the appropriate lump
sum taxes/subsidies to avoid the change having any distributive effects.
The change in the structure of the debt this period means, of course, that
its interest obligations next period will be altered; and this necessitates
some change, either in taxes or in debt.
The perturbation in public financial policy considered in the second
irrelevance theorem can be easily described. We increase, say, the supply
of indexed bonds and decrease the supply of short—term (unindexed) bonds in
such a way as to leave the government budget constraint still satisfied.
Thus, denoting the change in the supply of indexed bonds by LD and the
change in the supply of short-term (unindexed) bonds by AB ,werequire
(12) q1tD1 + vAB
=0, >0, < 0
The next period, the increase in indexed bonds gives rise to additional
interest payments of ,whilethe decrease in (unindexed) short—term.22
bonds reduces interest payments by iB .Sincewe are concerned with tem-
porary changes in the structure of the government debt, we assume that the
next period the government decides to reduce the indexed bonds by the axaount
that it had increased them the previous period, and increase the (unindexed)
short—term bonds by the amount it had reduced them the previous period.
(The analysis for the case where the return to the ex ante structure of the
government debt is postponed follows along similar lines.)
This gives rise to a deficit (or surplus) in the government budget.
To finance this deficit, we impose a lump sum tax on the middle aged and the
aged. The exact pattern of the imposition of this tax makes no difference.
All that is required is that the individuals know the preceding period what
fraction of the tax burden they will bear, i.e.:
(13) = [(1+i)v" lLBF + q111 + jv1tD1]
(14) 32—l =(l—a)[(l+i)v1tB+ q111 + iv1,D1]
To see that such a perturbation in public financial policy has no
effects, we again assume that all prices remain unchanged. We then show
that individuals' consumption opportunity sets are completely unaffected.
Hence, they will choose the same point in the consumption opportunity set
as they chose in the initial equilibrium. We then show that, when this
point in the consumption opportunity set is chosen, the demand for all
securities——including those whose supply has changed——equals the supply.
The change in the structure of the government debt has given rise to an
exactly offsetting change in the demand for different financial instruments.23
Tosee that the consumption opportunity set remains unchanged, we again
use a single caret to denote values of variables in the initialsituation,
and double carets to denote values of variables in the new situation.Let
A
(15a) a.= ,L.=L. all i,t
itititit
(15b) ijt =ijt alli,j,t
(15c) ijt =ijt









To check that such a policy is feasible, first observe that attime t ,
theincreased expenditures on indexed bonds, less the decreased expenditures
on (unindexed) short—term bonds adds up, for the young, to
+
which, by (12) is identically zero. Similarly forthe middle aged. Second,
notice that with the perturbation in their portfolios "corrected" next period,
the change in the wealth of the young the second period of theirlife is
+ + iv1tDj]24
exactly enough to pay off the extra tax liabilities which they will face
(equation (14a)). (Similarly for the middle aged—turned—aged.) It is thus
immediate that this change in portfolio leaves them in a position to pay
their extra tax liabilities and have their consumption completely unaffected
(in every state of nature).
To complete the argument that the consumption opportunity sets are
identical, we mustagain show thatany point which is feasible with the new
publicfinancialpolicy was feasible under the original public financial
policy. This follows by exactly parallel arguments. (Again, we need to
point out that the two consumption opportunity sets will be equivalent if
there are no binding non—negativity constraints. Since it may be more
difficult for individuals to issue indexed bonds or perpetuities than to
issue short—term bonds, non—negativity constraints may be more relevant
here than in the previous case.)
Since the consumption opportunity sets are the same, if the individual
chooses the careted values of variables in the original situation, he will
choose the double—careted values in the new situation.
A
Thetotal increase in the demand for indexed bonds at time t is
cxLD1 + (l-c) =
theincrease in the supply of indexed bonds, while the total decrease in the
demand for short—term (unindexed) bonds is
ctB + (l—c)LB
=
justequal to the decrease in the supply. Since the demandforall other
securities (and for all commodities) remains unchanged, if in the initial25
situation all securities and goods markets cleared, they do in the new
Situation.
This result has an important implication. It means that changes in the
number of indexed bonds have no consequences, either real or financial.
Onlyif the issuance of indexed bonds opens up trading opportunities for
individualswho are alive contemporaneously over two periods to exchange
risks which they otherwise could not can the provision of indexed bonds by
the government have any real effects. It is obvious that a sufficient con-
dition for the government provision of indexed bonds to have, no real effects
is that there be a complete set of securities at date t whose payoffs are
contingent on the state at t+l (a condition which is far weaker than a
complete set of Arrow—Debreu securities markets). An alternative sufficient
condition is that the private market provide an indexed bond (or that there
exists a linear combination of securities which provides a safe real return).
A third set of circumstances in which the public provision of indexed
bonds does not matter, even when such bonds are not provided in the private
market, are those in which, were there an exchange market f or indexed bonds,
there would be no trade in them; in such situations, we say thatanindexed
bondmarket is redurLdant) A sufficient condition for the redundancy of the
indexed bond market is that individuals be risk neutral.2
1. Newbery and Stiglitz (1982) introduce the conceptof redundant markets in
theiranalysis ofthe constrained Pareto optimality of markets with
rationalexpectations but an incomplete set of risk markets.
2.That is, individuals' utility functions are of the form c1 + c2 + c3
If the indirect utility function corresponding to u(c1, c2, c3) can be
written as v(I, g1, g2) ,where is the intertemporal price between
the first and second period, and g is the intertemporal price between
the first and third period, and I is (the present discounted value of)
lifetime income, income risk neutrality implies that v =I1)(g1,g2)
•In general, this is not sufficient to ensure the redundancy of indexed
bond markets.(Cf. Newbery—Stiglitz (1982), Stiglitz (1982).)26
It should be equally obvious that, in general, if for some inexplicable
reason an indexed bond (or its equivalent) were not provided in the exchange
market, and such a security is not redundant, then the government provision
of this security will have real effects. Provided the government has suffi-
cient flexibility in its imposition of lump sum taxes and subsidies, the
provision of these indexed bonds will be a Pareto improvement.
2.5 The Third Irrelevance Theorem
An increase in the nominal interest rate on short—term (unindexed)
ernment bonds financed by an increase in the supply of short—term bonds has
financial effects, but no real effects. The price level (v) changes, and
consequentlythe price of other securities relative to the short—term bond
changes; but the price of these other securities relative to consumption
goods remains unchanged.
Assumethe government increases the interest rate on short—term bonds
outstandingat datetfrom i to .Thisgenerates a deficit the
next period of (Ai)B ,where
=
Nowwe assume that the real return on all securities remains unchanged,
(j= 1,2),allTisunchanged, v remains unchanged, and the real
value of government debt at all subsequent dates is unchanged, i.e.:
A
(16)vB vB
It is immediate from (4) that under these conditions the government's budget
constraint is satisfied now if it was satisfied originally. Since from the27
structureof the demand functions individuals' real demands for securities
at all dates (e.g., vTBiT) is a function only of real returns, taxes and
wages (all of which remain unchanged), real demands are unchanged.. Since by
hypothesisreal supplies are unchanged, if demand equalled supply initially,
it still does. Note that for to remain unchanged requires (from (2))
that
(17) V+l
remainunchanged, for T > t+l .This,together with our earlier result
((16)—(17)), implies that an increase in the interest rate at time t increases
prices (decreases v )atall subsequent dates proportionately, and increases
the supply of bonds in proportion to the decrease in the price of short—term
bonds (v)
It immediately follows that any sequence of changes in the interest
rate paid on short—term bonds has no real effects.
2.6 Combinations of Policies
The three irrelevance propositions can be combined to consider avariety
of financial policies of the government which can be viewed as combinations
of the three particular policies considered. Thus, if the government decides
to issue indexed bonds at time t,tobe retired at time t+l,then,
provided the appropriate lump sum taxes are imposed to offset any distribu-
tional consequences, the policy has neither real nor financial (price) effects.1
1. We canalsomakeadirect argument for the irrelevance of this financial
policy, as we noted earlier.28
Such a change can be decomposed into two steps. The government issues short—
termunindexedbonds, with the proceeds used to reduce lump sum taxes on the
young or middle aged. By the first irrelevance theorem, such a change has
neither real nor financial consequences. Then the government temporarily
exchanges the increase in the short—term uniridexed bonds for short—term
indexed bonds, again imposing taxes (the next period) on the (then) middle
aged and old to finance the deficit which will then result.. By the second
irrelevance theorem, such a change has no real or financial consequences.
As a second example, suppose that the government simultaneously in-
creases the supply of short—term bonds and increases the interest rate it
pays on these bonds (perhaps because it mistakenly believes that it must in
order to sell the increased supply of these bonds). Assume that at the same
time it increases the supply of bonds it announces that it will shortly
retire the additional bonds, in such a way as to have no intergenerational
distributional effects. Then, such a change can be thought of as a combina-
tion of a temporary increase in the supply of short—term bonds (which, by
the first irrelevance theorem, has no effects) and an increase in the interest
rate (which, by the third irrelevance theorem, has no real effects but does
increase the rate of inflation).
2.7 An Alternative Interpretation
Note that if individuals believe that the rate of inflation is going to
be higher as a result of the increase in the supply of short—term bonds, then
equilibrium can be restored (and their beliefs confirmed) if the interest
rate which the government pays rises in accord with their expectations.29
To put it another way, though we have presented the analysis as if the
government sets the interest rate on government bonds, we could have phrased
the analysis in a slightly different way; rather than announcing interest
rates which the government will pay at different dates in different contin-
gencies, we could have announced the corresponding bond supplies, and let
the market determine the interest rates which are consistent with equilibrium.
(This way of looking at the matter has a slightly greater sense of realism,
since the interest rates on short—term bonds are determined in competitive
auction markets, in response to government announcements concerning the
supply of bonds.)
III. The Relevance of Public Financial Policy
In general, any financial policy other than those presented in the pre-
ceding section will have both real and financial effects. Public financial
policy is not irrelevant. Since public financial policy matters, it is im-
portant to ask what are the relative merits of alternative financial policies.
The objective of this and the next section is to show that financial policy
is relevant and to provide some insights into the consequences of alternative
policies.
To do this, we simplify the general model presented in the preceding
section. We assume individuals live for only two periods (which eliminates
the possibility of exchange securities), working only in the first.'
We illustrate our general proposition concerning the relevance of public
financial policy by considering the kind of financial policy discussed in the
1. Thus, the model which we analyze here is a slight extension of that
presented in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).30
first irrelevance theorem. The government increases its debt at one date)
t1 ,withthe proceeds distributed as lump sum payments (either to the young
or the old); and at some later date, t2 ,reducesthe debt. To do this, it
again raises taxes. The dates t1 and t2 are sufficiently far apart that
quite different generations are involved; there are intertemporal redistribu-
tion effects. (In intervening periods it increases the short—term bond supply
to pay the additional interest Costs.) The question is, under what conditions
will the change in debt policy have no real effects, e.g., on the rate of
capital accumulation?'
There is one special case that may be helpful in developing our intuition
as to why public financial policy is, in general, relevant. Assume that there
is no risk, and bonds and capital are thus perfect substitutes. Clearly, they
must yield the same return. This in turn implies that if the change in debt
policy is to have no effect, the price level in the new equilibrium must be
the same as the price level in the old equilibrium at every date t .But
this implies that the real supply of bonds must have increased in the period
< t < t2 .Butfor those generations between t1 and t2neither their
taxes2 norwages are changed, and thus their savings must remain unchanged at
each date. But if savings are unchanged, while real debt is increased,
capital accumulation must be decreased. It is impossible for financial policy
not to matter.
1. There is a prima facie case that such a change will have a real effect on
the intergenerational distribution of welfare, except if there are exactly
offsetting changes in private bequests, as Barro has argued. For several
theoretical objections to Barro's conclusions, see Stiglitz (1982).
2. Except to the slight extent necessary to finance the interest on the
additional bonds.31
Similarly,if the real debt remained unchanged (so v changes inversely
to Bt ),1 at t1—l individuals would recognize that the return to holding
bonds will be lower for the next period as a result of the increased debt.
But this would decrease their demand for bonds. Market equilibrium at t1—l
would then require that bond prices change at that date; but then the real
bond supply at that date is altered, and this would have real effects, e.g.,
on capital accumulation.
Exactly parallel arguments hold if there is uncertainty, so that debt
and capital are not perfect substitutes. To see this most vividly, we re-
strict ourselves to policies which leave i unchanged, and leave the mean
real return to short—term bonds unchanged (so that the mean rate of inflation
alsoremains unchanged) Thegovernment announces that at some date t+1
in the future it will alter the financial policy from what it had previously
planned. It will increase the short—term debt in some state, and decrease
it in another. (In all other states and dates, financial policy is unchanged.)
Moreover, the surplus (deficit) thus generated will be distributed to the
young of thet+l generation. We show that, unless the marginal utility
ofincome inthe two states is identical (the individual is risk neutral),
sucha policy hasreal effects.
Ifwe simplify our general model and assume that the individual has a
separable utility function of the form
1.This corresponds (for our model) to the quantity theory, i.e., the price
level is inversely proportional to the supply of outside short—term bonds
(money).
2.It should be clear that our analysis extends to more general changes in
publicfinancial policy.32
U1(c1, L) + U2(c2)
and for notational simplicity we assume the government only issues short—
term bonds (there are no long—term or indexed bonds), then we can write the
tth generation's first—ordercondition for the optimal investment portfolio
(18) EIJ [(1+n)K + (l+pt)B —T2](p
—r) = 0
(where,it will be recalled,fl is the real return on capital).
We shall consider two cases. In the first, the price of bonds at t+l
changes in the two states, SOPtchanges. Then, the individual's portfolio
condition (18) will still be satisfied if and only if
(19) tfU[c] (p -n)}+ U[c] (p -n))
=0
(where the superscripts a and b denote the two states with altered prices).
Recalling our hypothesis that the mean return is the same, this implies for a
small change in p ,that2
(20) Bu[P —a+ ,a =Bu1'[p
—bj+
This will not, in general, be satisfied, except if U" =0,i.e.,the mdi—
vidual is risk neutral.
Assume, on the other hand, that the price of bonds at t±l does not
change. The increase in the supply of bonds results in an increase in the
demand for bonds by the young (because of the lump sum transfer payment made
1. Assuming the two cases are equally likely. The modification for the
more general case is straightforward.
2. We are making use of the assumption that the mean rate of inflation
remains unaltered.to the young with the proceeds of the bonds), but the increase in the demand
for bonds will be less than the increase in supply provided only that first
period consumption and equities are normal. (That is, we require that a
decrease in the lump sum taxes by AT1+1 '+1 leads to an increase in
the real demand for short—term bonds by an amount less than AT1+i ,a
natural assumption.)
Hence, except under the strong and unrealistic hypothesis of risk
neutrality, a mean inflation preserving change in financial policy has real
effects.
3.1 Financial Policy and Intergenerational Risk Sharing
In the preceding section we established that, except under the special
conditions specified in theorems 1 through 3, public financial policy has
important redistributive consequences, and whenever public financial policy
has intergenerational redistributive consequences, public financial policy
matters. The level of capital accumulation, for instance, will depend on
public financial policy.
Different public financial policies will have different implications
for how the risks faced by society are shared among different generations.
The intergenerational redistributions to which variations in debt policy
give rise can be used to provide a kind of insurance which the market cannot
provide (since members of one generation cannot make contracts with members
of another generation, except through the government). The intertemporal
distribution of risk is presumably one of the objectives of a well designed
social security program; as we have asserted before, it is impossible to
separate out debt policy from social security. All public financial policies
must be examined together.34
Thus, ifthepresent generation is lucky, and experiences, say, a high
wageor a high return on capital, it can share this "luck" with succeeding
generations. In return, generations which have particularly bad luck (say,
a low wage), can be partially compensated by an increase in social security
paymentsto the elder individuals in that generation.(It should be clear
that this insurance argument involves no altruism, and thus is distinctly
different from the considerations which motivate intergenerational transfers
of income based on children's welfare entering parents' utility functions.)
In this section we shall show how different financial policies give
rise to different stochastic processes for prices (and the other relevant
variables in the economy), and how, as a result, different financial policies
affect the extent to which intertemporal risks are shared among different
generations.
We shall consider three polar policies: the first and simplest keeps
the real value of debt (vB) fixed; the second keeps the price level (v)
fixed and has the debt supply change by whatever amount is necessary to en-
sure that; andthethird keeps the debt fixed (and corresponds to the
Friedman rule for this economy, where there is no growth).
There is a widespread belief that the last ruleisthe best rule.
Variations in the debt (money supply) lead to variability in the level of
economic activity, and make it difficult for firms to distinguish variations
in demand arising from variations in, say, tastes (real changes in the
economy) from variations in demand arising from monetary disturbances. In
the simple model which we have developed in this paper, these beliefs are
shown to be incorrect. A constant supply of government debt (or money)35
forces individuals to absorb a considerable amount of risk which could be
shared better (among different generations) by alternative financial poli-
cies. Thus, if the next generation has a high wage, this leads to a high
demand for assets in general, including financial assets; as a result, the
value of government bonds (relative to goods) increases; but conversely, if
the next generation has a low wage, the demand for financial assets is
reduced, and the price of bonds (relative to consumption goods) is reduced;
some of the consequences of variations in the t+l generation's wages are
effectively borne by the members of the th generation. This, we will see,
is also true of the other financial policies which we consider. The issue
is thus not whether one policy or another eliminates risk; rather, the issue
is, which of the simple policies being considered is most effective in sharing
the risks among different generations. We shall show that for the model in-
vestigated here, the policy of a constant real debt is preferable to the
other two policies.
a.Constant real money supply. This is the easiest policy to analyze.
To generate a constant real money supply, the government imposes a lump sum
tax on the young, used to retire the government debt, whenever the wage exceeds
w ,themean wage, and conversely when the wage is less than For sim-
plicity, we set i =0for allt .Thus,the government sets
(21) —bIB =(w
—
Asa result, the net income (after paying lump sum taxes) of each generation
is constant, at w .Noticethat this implies that the debt follows a random
walk. Since Byk















The probability distribution of the return to debt is the same every period,
andhence,since income (after tax) is the same, the real demand for gov—
ernment debt is indeed fixed.
Onemightbe tempted, in this situation, to say that the change in debt
(government deficits) causes the change inprices;but this would be mis-
leading. The exogenous event in the model is the level of wages; government
policy adjusts to the change in wages in such a way as to result in prices
moving proportionately to the debt; but prices would change, as we have em-
phasized, even in the absence of a change in the debt supply.
The variability of consumption may be easily calculated. Since real
income is fixed the first period, there is no variability In a1 .Agiven
fraction of income, s ,willbe saved,' andofthis, a particular fraction
a will be invested in capital and the remainder in government bonds. Thus,
(22)c =s[a(1+fl)+ (l_a)(l+p)]
=s[a(l+fl)+ (1—a)
1. Sincenet income, after taxes, is constant, and since the rate of return
to bonds and equities is constant, savings rates and portfolio alloca—





Note that consumption in the second period of the thgeneration individual
depends not on his own wages, but on thewages of those working when he is
old. The higher their wages, the greater hisconsumption. We can now cal—
cul ate
2—2 2 2varw (23) var c =sw [ci var r + (1—ci) I
k'
2—2 2 =sw civarfl+varw
(since By =(l-a)s=k).Thereis an alternative way of calculating the
variance of c2t .Sincec1 and K are fixed, the variance of c2 is
simply the variance of national income.
2 (24) var c2 var w + K var i
b. Constant price level. Assume the government adjusts the deficit
every period in such a way as to keep the price level constant; it uses the
proceeds (finances the deficit) with a lump sum distribution to (taxupon)
the aged. The individual saves a fraction s of his firstperiod income,
and of this he invests a fraction ciin capital and the remaining in debt.1
We allow s to be a function of w, s(w).Withoutloss of generality, let
p =v=1for all t.Forthe demand for government bonds to equal the
supply, we require that
(25) s()(l_ci) =
1.In contrast to the previous case, where we proved a ands constant,
here we simply assume thatci is constant and s afunctionof w
But see fn. 2, p. 40.38
It immediately follows from the government's budget constraint that if the
changes in debt are offset by changes in payments to the aged,






(27b) c2 =sa(l+) + (l_ct)s+iw+1
K(l+nt) + w+1s+1(l_cL)
(from the national income identities). Now, there is variability in the
individual's income in both the first and second periods of his life, and
his consumption the second period depends both on his wage and the wage the
next period. For small variances, we can calculate the variance of
and c2 in a straightforward manner:
-.
(28a) var c1 =var(1-s (w))w -(1-s—sw) var w
(28b) var c2 =(1—ct)2(s+ ?)2 var w + 2 var r + (l+)2 var K
,—2 2 —2 2 2 =(s+ s w) (o (l-1-)+ (l-o) )varw + (ctsw)var r
Suppose the government chooses i (the rate of return on government debt)
insuch a way as to make the average value of K the same as itis in the
situationwitha constant real debt. Since K is the same, and average
income of the young is the same in this regime as in the previous, sa39
must be the same. We postulate that a is the same, implying that the
average values of c1 and c2 are the same. But while the variance of
c1 is higher with the constant price rule, the variance of c2 may be
higher or lower with the constant real debt rule. (Compare (23) and (28).)
Consider first the limiting case with s =1.Thenstraightforward
calculations show that the variance of c2 is lower with the constant real
debt policy provided only that
l+ -(1-a)2
If government debt constitutes 15% of individuals' savings, this implies
that when the mean real return on capital exceeds 16%, the policy of a
constant real debt is unambiguously preferable.
More general comparisons require a specification of the utility function.
Assume we have a utility function of the form
U(c2) U =U(c1)+1+6
Then, the loss in welfare from the consumption variability can be approxi-
mated by, assuming U"(c1)/U'(c1)U"(c2)/U'(c2) (which will be true if
6 and var iissmall)
a 1 —a var c1 + var c2 —varw (1—s —sw)
22 —2 —2
(s + s w) ((1—ct)+ a(1—n) )}Kvar r +
1+6 1+6
where40
a =— -j- ,theArrow—Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion.
This should be contrasted with the loss of welfare in the preceding case.
The loss of welfare is greater with a policy of a constant price level than
with a policy of a constant real debt, under even weaker conditions than
1,2,3 those derived for s =1
1. We require
(1—s -s')2(l-1-)+ (s + s')2((l-c)2 a2(1+)2) > 1
2
i.e, (s + s' (l+5)
+ (s + s'w)2(l—2a + c2 + ct2(i+2 +rì2)) —2(s+ s') —2(s+ s'w)
+ô 0
2. While in the previous analysis of the constant real debt policy the result
that the savings rate was a constant held for all utility functions, here
we have simply assumed a savings function, without deriving it. The dif-
ficulty in deriving the optimal savings behavior arises from the random
lump sum tax imposed on the individual in the second period of his life.
Still, it is easy to show that if the distribution of wt+l is either in-
dependentof wt or a functiononly of wt ,thatSt and c will
simply be functions of wt .Itis possible to analyze some special cases.
Ci)Ifindividuals obtain utility only from consumption ifl the second
period, s =1. will then be a constant if the individual has constant
relative risk aversion, and the distribution of Wt+l/wt is independent of
t .(Wethus need to assume that wt is a random walk, in contrast to the
rest of this paper, where we have assumed that Wt are independently and
identically distributed random variables.) Alternatively, if there is
constant absolute risk aversion, then the demand for risky assets is a
constant, so thatinstead of (25) we obtain
we_k =B
In this limiting case, the variance associated with the constant price
ruleand thatassociated with the constant real debt rule are identical.
(ii) If there is no capital——a pure consumption—loans model——then
a =0.Thenif individuals have a quadratic utility function, consump-







3. We have limited our discussions to the case where the proceeds of the in-
crease in the government debt are used to finance a lump sum subsidy to
the aged. It is possible to show that with the alternative financial
policy, of distributing the proceeds of the increased government debt to
the young, it is not possible to maintain (forever) a constant price level,
under plausible utility functions.
Assume first that all individuals have constant absolute risk aversion.
Then the.demand for capital is fixed, independent of income. Thus, the
variations in the debt must be large enough to accommodate the variations




But since there is no way, at t—l to know w ,thispolicy is not imple—
mentable: there is no policy of the form considered here which can maintain
a constant price level. The reason for this is simple. Increases in the
supply of debt generate an increase in demand on a dollar—for—dollar basis.
Assume, in contrast, that all individuals have constant relative risk
aversion. Then
={w+ B —














The process (29) can best be studied by taking a continuous time approx-
imation, which generates a process of the familiar Ornstein—Uhlenbeck form.
In steady state, AB has zero mean and variance This
ignores, of course, the non—negativity constraints on K and on c
Taking these into account, it is apparent that a policy of keeping price
constant is not, in the stipulated circumstances, feasible. Even before
the policy breaks down, however, the variance in income to which it gives
rise is likely to be greater than for the policy of constant real money
supply.41
(c) Constant nominal money supply. Though this is purportedly the
"simplest" policy, it is not the simplest policy to analyze. The probability
distribution of the return to bonds will not be the same at each date, and
hence, even if the utility functions have constant elasticity, the demand for
bonds will not be a constant proportion of savings. To see this most simply,
assume there are two equally likely states with wagesw1 and w2. For sim—
plicity, assume the probability distribution of the return to capital is the
same in both. For simplicity, let us assume s =1(individuals get no en-
joyment out of consumption the first period of their lives). Equilibrium
is characterized by a value of a Ka, ,andKb satisfying
EU(Ka(l÷fl) + VaB)((l+l) —(l+))÷EU'(K8(i+)
b
+ v'B ((l+i)! —(l+))0
(Kb(l+) + VaB) ((l+i) -(l+n))+ EU' (Kb(l+n)
(30)
+ vbBl+j) -(l+))=0
aa a K+vB =w
b b b K +vB =w
Where we have assumed interest payments are financed by lumpsum taxes on the aged.
In the good state, the demand for bonds is high because savings are high.
However,if theeconomy moves to a poor state next period, there will be a
fallin the value of bonds. Hence, although individuals normally invest
more in bonds in the good state, as a proportion of savings, they invest









var c (1+)2(var w + B2 var v —2Bcoy (w,v))
+ B2 var v + var (l+)
anditis clear that the policy of a constant debt (B) induces a greater
variance in consumption than does the policy of constant real money supply,
provided nislarge enough.
In this section, we have compared three alternative, simple financial
policies. None of these policies are, however, optimal. In Stiglitz(1982),
I show how the optimal intertemporal distribution of welfare can, in fact,
be implemented through the appropriate set of public financial policies. I
show, moreover, that to implement the optimal financial policy, oneneeds
only to have sufficient flexibility in the structure of social security pay-
ments and a single public financial instrument; additional bonds (including
indexed government securities) make no difference. However, if there are
restrictions on the extent to which social security payments (taxes) may43
vary from year to year, then additional financial instruments are necessary
in order to implement the optimal intertemporal distribution of welfare1
IV. Monetary and Debt Policy
In this paper, I have assumed that there is a single, interest bearing
financial asset, which presumably can be used for transactions purposes as
well as a store of value. Recent developments in monetary institutions
(interest bearing checking accounts) makes this assumption not as unreason-
able as it might have seemed a decade or so ago. How important is it that
(until recently) demand deposits did not earn interest? Will the widespread
use of CMA accounts have a fundamental effect on the structure of the
economy? It is plausible that what remains of non--interest bearing financial
assets-—cash and currency used to pay those taxi cabs who still do not take
VISA cards or checks——will be the driving force in the determination of
economic behavior that monetarists have claimed in the past?
These questions cannot be settled by theoretical arguments. Theoretical
analyses can establish whether the presence of a non—interest bearing financial
asset which is used to facilitate transactions has qualitative effects; they
cannot, however, assess the quantitative importance of any effects noted.
1. The characterization of the optimal intergenerational scheme for risk
sharing is not an easy matter. In one case, we can borrow results from
the theory of optimal buffer stocks to provide a fairly complete charac-
terization. Assume that the return to capital is not random, that indi-
viduals have an inelastic labor supply, and that they only consume the
second period of their lives. Assume, moreover, that wt is i.i.d.
Then the stock of resources available for consumption or investment at
date t is S =wt+ Kt_i(l+ii) ,whereKt =S—c .Theoptimal in—
tertemporal consumption plan entails a nile which maximizes E'EU(ct)(l7l4S)t
s.t. Kt > 0 .Itis known that the optimal savings rule is highly non—linear.
Note that none of the financial rules we have considered are of the required
form. See Newbery—Stiglitz (1981).44
If there were only one financial asset, non-interest bearing money, our
analysis would be completely unaffected. We established earlier that corre-
sponding to any equilibrium, with a particular interest rate at each date,
and a particular level of prices at each date, there were an infinity of
equivalent (in a real sense) equilibria, which djffered in the interest rate
they paid and in the price level. Among the set of equilibria is one with
the nominal interest rate equal to zero.
However, if there are two financial assets, one of which is non—interest
bearing while the other yields a return, it is obvious that, if the former
asset is to be held by anyone, it must have some property which makes it more
attractive (at the same yield) than the interest bearing asset. It is con—
ventionally postulated that the non—interest bearing financial asset can be
more readily used for transactions purposes. We write the demand function
for money as
(32) =M(p, ..; w, ...;1' ...;
flfl:11......:T.T ...) - Vt+1
-t't+1'
Thedemand for money is a function of prices at date t and at all subse-
quent dates, the yield on interest bearing assets at date t and at all sub-
sequent dates; the yield on equities at date t and at all subsequent dates;
taxes and transfers at date t and at all subsequent dates; and the levels
of real income at date t ,I,andat all subsequent dates.
Two properties of this demand function should be noted. First, the
level of income appears explicitly to remind us of the transactions motive
for holding money, but it should be emphasized that this is probably not an45
adequate reduced form representation; for instance, changes in tax or debt
policy may induce changes in the sets of transactions that occur; these
generate changes in the demand for money which are quite distinct from the
change that they might induce in real income; similarly, changes in risk
will not only have a direct effect on portfolio composition, but also may
have an effect on the transactions demand for money. Since our main objective
is to argue that the introduction of a second, non—interest bearing asset
implies that government financial policy will not be neutral, the oversimpli-
fied version of the demand for money which we will employ will suffice for
our present purposes.
Second, we postulate that the demand for money is homogeneous of degree
one In all prices. Increasing prices at all dates leaves unchanged the return
on money, and is simply a change in units. This is, of course, well known.
But it should also be noted that the demand for money is not homogeneous of
degree one in the current price. Changing the current price does increase
the transactions demand for money; but if subsequent prices remain unchanged,
the real return on money is reduced, and the ttassetI demand for money will,
in general, decrease. There may, of course, be some special specifications
of utility functions and transactions technology for which the return on money
does not affect its demand, but for which the only determinant of the demand
for money (besides the level of income) is the opportunity cost associated
with holding the non—interest bearing asset (money) rather than the interest
bearing financial asset
Under further restrictions, we might be able to derive a demand function
for money in which the entire impact of future events (taxes, interest rates,46
yields on equities) on the demand for money could be summarized in, say, a
wealth variable. We could then write down a demand function for money
Md
(33) =Md(I,i;Wt)
which is of the kind conventionally seen in undergraduate texts. It is impor-
tant to emphasize, however, that a large number of not clearly articulated
assumptions had to be introduced into the analysis to reduce the general
demand function for money down to the simple form postulated above.
Consider now the impact of an open market operation which entails the
government exchanging a bond at t1 for money, which it will subsequently
undo at a later date t2 .Wefocus our attention on an economy with infin-
itely lived individuals, to avoid the intertemporal distribution issues
raised earlier. We wish to show that such a change will, in general, have
real effects on the economy.
Assume that it has no real impact, i.e., real incomes and real returns
are unchanged. This necessitates that the price level at time t increases
proportionately (so real holdings of money remain unchanged; otherwise, real
expenditures on transactions would change). The price level needs to change
proportionately not only at t1 ,butat all dates between t1 and t2
This, in turn, implies that if the real return to holding bonds is to be un-
changed at t1 and t2, i and i must change to offset the change in
1 2
the rate of change in prices. But a change in i and i will, in general,
1 2
generate a change in the demand for money. Only if the demand for money is invar-
iant to the financial opportunity cost of holding money (i.e., the demand for47
money is interest inelastic) will it be neutral. This is, of course, what
monetarists have assumed all along. The question is, is there any reasonable
specification of utility functions and transactions technologies which gen-
erates this? One can, of course, write down models with the individual needing
a fixed amount of money to engage in each transaction; but such models really
do little more than assume what is to be proved. The recent innovations in
financial institutions (CMA accounts) suggest that significant changes in the
opportunity cost of holding money will indeed result in significant changes
in the amount of non—interest bearing financial assets which individualsare
willing to hold for transactions purposes.'
We have ignored so far the possibility that there is another financial
asset, produced in the private sector, which can be a substitute, for trans—
actions purposes, for the non—interest bearing government financial asset.
For simplicity, let us assume it is a perfect substitute. For both of these
assets to be held, it must yield a return of zero. The return to the suppliers
of this asset is thus i .Assumethey have a horizontal supply schedule,
at i .Then,for an interior solution, the market equilibrium rate of
interest must initially be at 1*,andmust remain so after the perturbation.
Assume the change in the private supply of money just offsets thechange in
the public supply of money, so that the price level remains unchanged. But
now, the supply of bonds is reduced. In our earlier analysis, corresponding
to any change in the supply of bonds, there was a corresponding change in the
1. Some of these changes may not be completely reversible: even if theoppor-
tunity cost declines, individuals will have discovered that they "need"
less non—interest bearing money than they had previously thought.48
demand for bonds. This will be the case here only if money and bonds are
perfect substitutes, for asset purposes, in individuals' portfolios, i.e.,
if individuals are indifferent about whether they receive the return on their
assets directly or through savings in transactions costs. In any case, there
will be a real effect on the economy through the increase in resources spent
on transactions costs (the private money supply). Only if the private money
supply is costless to produce (so i* is zero), will there be no impact,
but then the equilibrium return on
We can similarly show that an___________
bonds will be zero.
anticipated money rain (a lump sum dis-
tribution of money to individuals in the economy) will, in general, have
real effects. For again, assume it does not. Then, att1 ,thedate of
the money rain, prices must rise above what they would have been otherwise;
hence the return to money has been altered. For the real return to bonds to
remain unchanged, the rate of interest (1) must change; but unless the
demand for money is completely interest inelastic, this will change the
2 demand for (real) money at time
If the private money supply acts as a perfect substitute for the public
money supply, then it is possible that the price of money remains unchanged,
and since the supply of bonds has not been altered, the bond market is still
in equilibrium. Under these extreme assumptions, again the only real effect
1. Neutrality can be restored if costs of the government supplyingmoney are
identical to the costs of the private sector producing money. If we
assume, in contrast, that the private money supply remains unchanged, but
the price level changes to keep the real money supply fixed, then we are
back to our earlier analysis with no private money supply.
2. A similar observation has been made by Stanley Fischer in his excellent
paper, "Anticipations and the Nonneutrality of Money," where he details
the effects of a change in the money supply for a particular parameter—
ization of the economy.
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ofa money rain is on the expenditures of resources on the production of
private.money. Ignoring this effect, itshouldagain be noted that in this
instance, the change in the money supply has had neither an inflationary
effect nor a real effect.
The skeptical reader may well have misgivings about the quantitative
significance of all of this. Is it not a good enough approximation to ignore
the costs associated with producing money?
In macro—economics (as in any other branch of economics) we make simpli—
fications, idealizations, approximations. It is not always obvious what are
the most appropriate simplifications. Macro—economics is replete with models
where attention is centered on qualitative effects of phenomena whose quanti-
tative importance is at best dubious. There are, obviously, transactions
costs' and, in certain situations they aresignificant. There have been times,
such as in some recentyears inItaly, where the shortage of small denomination
coins caused minor inconvenience. It mayhavehadsome realeffects on the
economy: the consumptIon of smallcandies (given in change) may haverisen.
Here,as elsewhere, resourceful firms and individualsshould be——and are——
ableto find effective substitutes or to adapt their behavior to makea given
moneysupply "go further." It seems implausible that individuals, who are
presumed to be so flexible and rational in some dimensions, should be as rigid
and irrational with respect to their demand for money as some naive monetarist
theories seem to suggest.Theadaptations of behavior may indeed notbein—
1.Transactions costs, for instance, are often cited as explaining why the
private sector (the non—banking institutions) cannot provide a set of ex-
change media which are close substitutes to money. But the empirical
evidence on the transactions costs associated with CNA accounts andother
mutual fundssuggeststhat this is not a plausible explanation. See, also,
Bryant and Wallace (1980).50
stantaneous; and the institutional changes which facilitate the changes in
behavior may take even longer. But if the discrepancy between the return to
holding money and to bonds becomes significant enough, the economy will adapt,
to reduce the holdings of money or to enable "money" to become interest
bearing.
1
I am thus dubious whether the real effects of monetary policy that I
have analyzed in this section are of any quantitative significance. This is
not to say, however, that monetary policy may not have an important effect on
the economy (particularly in the short run, in the presence of short—run indi-
vidual and institutional rigidities); but the major mechanism by which this
may work arises not from a transactions or asset demand for money, but rather
from the central role of the banking system in supplying credit, and the link-
ages between monetary policy and credit availability.2
V.Fixed Prices and Public Financial Policy
The models considered throughout this paper have assumed that prices are
completely flexible and that, as a consequence, there is always full employ-
ment. Each generation faces risks——there is variability in the productivity
of labor and of capital—-but there is no risk of unemployment. Much of the
1. I made this prediction a decade ago, before the advent of NOW and CMA
accounts; recent events have bornethistheory out. Thus, although money
and bonds are clearly not perfect substitutes (otherwise, no one would be
willing to hold non—interest bearing currency), the approximation I have
employed seems at least as plausible as the alternative polar assumption
that individuals' demand for money is invariant to the difference between
the return to money and the return to bonds.
2. A preliminary version of this "credit" theory of monetary policy, based on
considerations of imperfect information in the credit market, is set forth
in Lecture 3 of Stiglitz (1977). See, also, Stiglitz—Weiss (1981, 1982).51
earlier literature on public financial policy focused on the effect of monetary
and debt policy on aggregate demand and the level of employment. We can use
a slight modification of the model we developed earlier to show how debt policy
can be used to affect the variability in employment.
We assume that the price level is fixed; it is well known that price
rigidities can give rise to unemployment equilibria. For simplicity, we
specialize our model, assuming a logarithmic utility function. This implies
that the savings rate is fixed at s Moreover, since with fixed prices
financial assets are perfectly safe, the proportion of his savings that the
individual invests in government debt (l-c*)is a function only of the
nominal rate of interest: a*(i) is the solution to
E 1)1 o
(34) ct(l+) + (l—ct)(l+i)
—
Weassume that the interest payments are financed by a lump sum tax on the
young. Hence, if the debt supply is fixed at B ,thedemand for debt is
given by
(35) s*(l_a)) [wN —iB]=
whenN is the level of employment.If we assume that in equilibrium the
demand for bonds must be equal to the supply (but equilibrium is consistent
with the demand for labor not equaling supply), then the level of employment
is given by
1. In the absence of variability in taxes the second period.52
(36) N =B[l+is*(l_a)]
t s*(l_ct)wt
In this highly simplified model, if the government fails to vary either the
debt supply or the interest rate, then variations in the level of productivity
of labor, w ,leadto exactly offsetting variations in the level of employ-
ment.
Variations in B can be used to stabilize the level of employment.
Consider the extreme case where i0 .Ifthe government varies its debt
according to the difference equation
(37) =s*(l_a*)[wN
+ Bt —Bt1]
where N is full employment, then there will be full employment; for the
demand for bonds will then be
(38) s*(l_a*)(wN + B —Bi)
which will just equal the supply. This implies that
s(l—cz)(w —w)N—(B1
—B*)







the equilibrium level of debt, in the absence of wage variability. This is,
of course, exactly the difference equation we analyzed earlier (fn. 3, p. 40)
in our discussion of the financial policy which would sustain a constant
price level (with the variations in government revenue being used to finance
lump sum distributions to the young). Whenwagesare high, the government
expands the debt (an accommodating public financial policy). There is, how-
ever, a force returning the debt to its long—run equilibrium level B*
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have attempted to set the question of the effect of
government indexed bonds into the much broader context of the effect of
alternative public financial policies. Whether a change in public financial
policy has any effect depends simply on whether the change has an effect on
the intertemporal distribution of income. We have shown that there are some
important classes of public financial policies which, when appropriately
implemented, have no effect on the intergenerational distribution of welfare.
Some of these policies——such as an increase in the supply of government debt
or a change in the maturity structure of the government debt——have neither
real nor financial effects; while others, such as an increase in the interest
paid on government bonds, have financial effects but no. real .effects. On
1. Note that by lowering i it may not be possible to lower the demand for
financial assets enough to restore full employment. If individuals believe
that there is a significant probability that r <0(they will make a
loss on their investment in capital), then even at i =0,(l—a)wN<B
(This is analogous to Keynes' liquidity trap.)
Recall in our earlier discussion of the difference equation (39) that
the relevant non—negativity constraints will eventually be violated. This
suggests that to maintain full employment may require combining interest
rate policies with policies of debt expansion.54
the other hand, if the public financial policy has an effect on the inter-
generational distribution of welfare—-and virtually all changes in public
financial policy other than those spelled out in our three basic irrelevance
propositions will have an effect on the intergenerational distribution of
welfare——the change in public financial policy will have important effects
on the economy, e.g., on the pattern of capital accumulation.
Thus, the question of the effect of the provision of government in-
dexed bonds comes down to whether a switch from, say, unindexed to indexed
government securities would have any redistributional effect. We haveshown
how, under certain circumstances, an increase in the supply of indexed bonds
will have neither real nor financial effects on the economy.
Once it is recognized that government public financial policy can have
important effects on the intergenerational distribution of welfareand the
sharing of risks among generations, it becomes important to ascertainthe
consequences of alternative policies. We have shownthat while none of the
simplerules commonly discussed-—keeping the money supply or debt fixed;
keepingthe price level fixed; or keeping the real value of the government
debtfixed——is optimal, the policy of keeping the real value of the govern-
mentfixed appears to provide for the least intergenerationalvariability in
consumption.
Although most of our analysis has been conducted under the assumption
thatprices are perfectly flexible, andthatthere is a single,interest
bearingshort—term security (which canbeused for transactions purposes),
we haveshown that when these assumptions are removed, the case for the rele-
vanceof public financial policy is even stronger. For instance, only in
the limiting cases where the demand for money is perfectly interest inelastic
canan open market operation have no real effects if there is noinside money;and if there is inside money, an open market operation can have no real effects
only if the costs of the government supplying money are identical to the costs
of the private sector producing money.
If prices are rigid, then financial policy can serve the additional
function of reducing the variability in employment, a role which was tradi—
tionally ascribed to public financial policy but which it has lost in the con-
text of the currently fashionable neoclassical models.
Two important questions still need to be addressed. First, we need to
formulate a model synthesizing the two roles of public financial policy, of
intergenerational risk sharing and income and employment stabilization.
Second, we have assumed throughout that only lump sum taxes are imposed. In
that case, the timing of taxes affects the intergenerational distribution of
welfare, but nothing more. But when taxes are distortionary, the timing of
taxes also affects the total dead weight loss imposed by the tax system. Thus,
whenever the changes in financial policy which we analyzed in our basic
irrelevance propositions entail a change in the lump sum taxes imposed at
different times, then, in general, those changes in financial policy will
have real effects. The implication of this for the optimal debt—tax struc-
ture is an important question which we hope to address on another occasion.REFERENCES
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